Edward J. Larson.
A magnificent catastrophe: The
tumultuous election of 1800, America’s first presidential campaign. New York: Free Press. 2007.
Any presidential race elicits groans that the
current crowd can’t compare with the Founding Fathers. Warren Harding’s speeches “leave the
impression of an army of pompous phrases moving over the landscape in search of
an idea,” said Woodrow Wilson’s son-in-law, William McAdoo. “Sometimes these meandering words would
actually capture a straggling thought and bear it triumphantly, a prisoner in
their midst, until it died of servitude and overwork.”
Larson reminds us that the Saints of ’76 were not
above a few choice slings of mud. When
an aged general of the Revolutionary War, Horatio Gates, ran for the New York
Assembly at the turn of the century, a rival newspaper recalled his defeat at
Camden. “If the General runs as well at the election, he cannot
fail of success.”
Despite vintage vitriol, the presidential election
of 1800 may have been the first not to resemble, as today’s do, a popularity contest. George Washington, the indispensable man, had
dominated the elections of 1789 and 1792; despite a few virulent newspapers, no
one could touch him. In 1796 John Adams
rode into office on Washington’s Federalist coattails. Now Adams, the begrudged leader of the
Federalists, faced Thomas Jefferson, the vice president and the undisputed head
of the Democrat-Republicans.
In modern political theory, a two-candidate race is
determined by the median voter, who separates the leftist half of the electorate
from the rightist. The liberal candidate
can only gain by moving to the right, since he will retain liberal voters. Similarly, the conservative contender can
pick up votes by sliding to the left.
Eventually Tweedle-Dee will confront Tweedle-Dum. Personal popularity, or luck, will determine
the race.
In contrast, the 1800 election hinged on
issues. Adams’ camp, rooted in New
England, favored relations with Britain as well as a strong federal government
and an aristocratic elite in charge of it.
Jefferson’s camp, strong in the South, sought relations with
revolutionary France, states’ rights, and power in the hands of the common man
(presumably a small farmer, although Jefferson himself was anything but).
Why didn’t both candidates move towards the
center? Perhaps they didn’t realize the
harvest of votes that this strategy could achieve. After all, transport and communications were
slow and expensive, and campaigning in person lacked dignity. Or perhaps the handful of state legislators
who determined the presidential vote in most states did not follow a smooth
bell-shaped distribution of preferences over issues as well as the populace did.
In any event, the candidates survived or died by the
issues. Adams’ late decision to seek
peace with the French cost him Federalist support without attracting Republican
voters. Consequently, although the
incumbent, His Rotundity was not a serious contender.
The race that went down to the wire was
between Jefferson and his superior as a politician, the Republican Aaron Burr. That race,
to be decided by the House of Representatives, hinged on personalities:
Jefferson, to all appearances, was the lesser rogue. Burr was “a profligate without character and
without property – a bankrupt in both,” declared the Speaker of the House,
Theodore Sedgwick. Federalist musings
that Burr may consequently prove pliable, were to no avail. Two weeks before the inauguration, Congress
elected Jefferson, who was none the worse for wear for the nation’s first, and
possibly hottest, presidential campaign. – Leon Taylor tayloralmaty@gmail.com
Good
reading
William E.
Leuchtenburg. The perils of prosperity, 1914-1932. University of Chicago Press.
Second
edition. 1993. The source of the McAdoo quote.
